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Antitrust Regulation of Land Use: Federalism’s
Triumph Over Competition, The Last Fifty Years
E. Thomas Sullivan*
 INTRODUCTION
It is a distinct privilege to write an article in this Festschrift
honoring my co-author, friend, and former colleague, Professor Dan
Mandelker. For fifty years, Dan Mandelker has been teaching and
writing in the fields of land use, urban planning, property, and
environmental law. He has no peers in the sweep of his intellectual
contributions over the last fifty years to these important areas of law.
In all of his scholarship, he has been a champion of a more balanced,
comprehensive, and coherent approach by government agencies to
land regulation.
This article analyzes antitrust regulation of land use during the last
fifty years, the time period Dan Mandelker played such a leading
role. It is a story of how federalism as a judicial doctrine achieved
ascendance over the marketplace model of competition in the field of
land use regulation.
The past century has seen several generations of developments at
the intersection of federal antitrust law and land use issues. In the
formative years of federal antitrust policy, the Commerce Clause
generally restricted Congress’ ability to regulate intrastate affairs.
Accordingly, municipalities were considered beyond the reach of the
Sherman Act and its progeny.1 Eventually, restrictions on the
* E. Thomas Sullivan, Dean and William S. Pattee Professor of Law, University of
Minnesota Law School. From 1984-1989, he was a Professor of Law at Washington University
School of Law and also served as Associate Dean. Special appreciation is extended to Herbert
Hovenkamp, who reviewed this article, and Tara Norgard for her invaluable research assistance.
1. See Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375, 375
(1983). Commerce Clause jurisprudence continues to evolve. Recently, the Alabama Supreme
Court limited the reach of Alabama’s state antitrust laws to conduct that affects only intrastate
commerce. Reasoning that at the time the Alabama antitrust statute was adopted there was a
clear division between interstate and intrastate commerce, until federal expansion in the 1940s,
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Commerce Clause diminished, giving rise to the possibility that the
federal antitrust laws may in fact permeate state boundaries. The
Supreme Court responded in 1943 with Parker v. Brown, which held
state actors immune to antitrust laws, given the sovereign status of
the states in a federal system.2 Although the Parker state action
doctrine clearly immunized states from antitrust liability, many
questions remained about whether and when the doctrine applied to
local governments.
The modern era of antitrust coverage of land use issues began in
1978. The Supreme Court in that year foreclosed the possibility that
the state action doctrine directly protects local governments.3
Immunity must flow from the states, the Court held. This idea was
codified by Congress in the Local Government Antitrust Act of
1984.4 Since then the Court has focused on refining the state action
analysis with an eye toward accommodating the dual policies of
federalism and free market competition.
The Court’s policy of federalism has been pivotal in protecting
local governments from antitrust liability. Most notably, federalism
has paved the way for an expanded state action doctrine, which now
serves as a formidable bulwark against antitrust review of official
government conduct. That shield is not immutable, however; it fails
to protect entities that act without authority from the state.
The First Amendment, through the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
also has proved a powerful force in shielding private actors whose
conduct in the local government arena might otherwise be subject to
antitrust scrutiny.5 Here, too, immunity has broadened but not to the
point of being absolute. With the power of the federal antitrust laws
largely diluted in the local government context, plaintiffs seeking
restitution from government actors for economic harms have
the present court does not wish to reinterpret retroactively the old antitrust statute’s
understanding of the limits of the Commerce Clause, because the legislature that passed the
statute could not have had the expanded extraterritoriality of the clause in mind at the time of
enactment, as it later developed. See Abbott Laboratories v. Durrett,746 So.2d 316 (Ala. 1999);
Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Seven Up Bottling Co. of Jasper, 746 So.2d 966 (Ala. 1999).
2. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
3. See infra Part I.A.
4. See infra Part I.E.
5. See infra Part III.
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employed alternative legal strategies for relief.
Today, the application of federal antitrust laws in the land use
context has come almost full circle. With federalism as the guiding
force, the second half of the century has brought the law closer to
where it started, albeit with certain exceptions and a refined
analytical framework. Although it is clear that federal antitrust laws
do have a role in the land use arena, that role is discreet and more
narrow than it has been in the past. The Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in this area over the last twenty years has been pivotal
in shaping that result. This article provides a retrospective look at the
most recent generation of legal developments regarding antitrust
regulation of land use. It identifies where the law is ripe for further
development and how equitable review by the courts is still
problematic for land use regulation.
I. THE MODERN ERA OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
Whether a local government entity is liable for a federal antitrust
attack largely depends on whether it qualifies for immunity under the
state action doctrine. When the Sherman Act was passed, the
possibility of municipal antitrust liability was not even considered.6
At that time, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Commerce
Clause prohibited federal law from encroaching on a state’s authority
to regulate local matters.7 When Commerce Clause jurisprudence
gave way to the possibility that the federal antitrust laws might
permeate state boundaries, the Court began to develop the state action
doctrine as a defense against antitrust liability. The trend that
emerged in subsequent years has been an expansion of the doctrine.
As a result, more entities enjoy its protection in a growing number of
circumstances.
6. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-41 (1943) (“Nothing in the language of the
Sherman Act or in its history suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or
agents from the activities directed by its legislature . . . [T]he Sherman Act . . . gives no hint
that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state.”).
7. See Hovenkamp, supra note 1.
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A. Historical Development
The state action doctrine, which protects state actors from antitrust
review, originated in 1943 with Parker v. Brown.8 The doctrine
respects the sovereign immunity afforded to the states in a federal
system where the states, not Congress, are entitled to regulate matters
within their own boundaries.9 Although the issue in Parker addressed
immunity in light of conduct at the state level, its language left room
for the possibility that local governments that administer state policy
might be protected, as well.10 Thirty years later the Court began to
circumscribe the reach of state action immunity in light of the
principles of federalism upon which the doctrine was founded.
Federalism centers on the authority of the sovereign states to
regulate their “domestic commerce” unless Congress plainly has
indicated a contrary result.11 By contrast, “[c]ities are not themselves
sovereign.”12 Accordingly, “they do not receive all the federal
deference of the States that create them,” and are only immune to the
extent they act with authority from the state.13 Beginning with
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the Court began to more clearly
define the standards that must be met for the state action doctrine to
reach non-state actors.14
From the beginning of the modern state action doctrine era, it was
clear that a local government’s immunity was conditioned on
authorization from the state to displace competition. Initially it
appeared that a high level of state oversight was required for
8. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
9. See id. at 351.
10. See supra note 6.
11. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 56-57
(1985).
12. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978).
13. Id. The Court feared that “serious economic dislocation . . . could result if cities were
free to place their own parochial interests above the Nation’s economic goals reflected in the
antitrust laws,” and was “especially unwilling to presume that Congress intended to exclude
anticompetitive municipal action from their reach.” Id. at 412-13.
14. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410 (1977) (requiring a “clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed” state policy for state action immunity at the local government level);
Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (implying that there must be a clear articulation
of state policy to displace competition in order for immunity to attach); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (limiting the doctrine’s application to political subdivisions of
the state and to private parties regulated or controlled by the state).
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immunity to attach. Goldfarb suggested that the state must compel
and actually supervise a municipalities’ conduct.15 That suggestion
was clarified three years later in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., where the Court held that immunity is limited to
instances where a municipality acts according to a “clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed” state policy to displace competition.16
Although City of Lafayette explicitly rejected the possibility that the
state action doctrine applied directly to local governments, it paved
the way for protection to flow through the state to a broad range of
municipal activities by setting a low standard for what constitutes
sufficient authorization. In the main, the state need not supervise,
mandate, or even explicitly authorize a local government’s
anticompetitive behavior so long as the state “contemplated the kind
of action complained of.”17
After City of Lafayette the Court deviated from the widening
developmental path of the state action doctrine. In Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, immunity did not attach
despite the city’s grant of local autonomy through a home rule charter
issued by the state. 18 The Court held that charter did not meet the
“clear articulation and affirmative expression criterion,” reasoning
that a grant of local autonomy, without more, does not indicate a state
15. See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791.
16. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 410. Because City of Lafayette involved a private
party, some confusion remained as to whether a municipality was required to meet the second
“active supervision” prong. The Court later clarified in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,
471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985), that municipalities do not need to meet this second prong, although
active supervision is still required in the case of private parties that are subject to state
legislation. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97 (1980). See also infra part I.D (discussing the state action doctrine as it applies to non-
government actors).
17. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (affirming appellate court’s conclusion on this
point). The Eleventh Circuit has established a three-part inquiry to determine whether an entity
satisfies the “clear articulation” test. The entity must show: “(1) that it is a political subdivision
of the state; (2) that, through statutes, the state generally authorizes the political subdivision to
perform the challenged action; and (3) that, through statutes, the state has clearly articulated a
state policy authorizing anticompetitive conduct.” Federal Trade Comm’n v. Hospital Bd. of
Dirs. of Lee County, 38 F.3d 1184, 1187-88 (11th Cir. 1994).
18. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 54-56 (1982). In
the wake of City of Boulder, some states have attempted to legislate the concept of “acting
pursuant to state policy.” See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 36-65-1 (1993); ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/35-
1 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 40-01-22 (1983).
Washington University Open Scholarship
p473+Sullivan+Thomas.doc 01/04/01
478 Festschrift [Vol. 3:473
policy to displace competition.19
The holding in City of Boulder sent earthquake shocks through
every city, municipality, and political subdivision in the country.
Congress was deluged with a flood of complaints and special
pleadings.20 With its narrow reading of the state action doctrine, City
of Boulder threatened to invalidate countless municipal ordinances
and expose local governments to unforeseen litigation and financial
liability. Bankruptcy frequently was mentioned as the only remedy
for cities and municipalities. The implications of the decision were
never fully realized, however, because the Local Government
Antitrust Act of 1984 barred antitrust damages against official state
actors, limiting the available remedy to injunctive relief.21 Moreover,
subsequent Court decisions returned to a broad interpretation of the
standards that must be satisfied for immunity to attach to a local
government’s activities.22
In more recent years the state action doctrine has continued to
afford ample latitude to the anticompetitive activities of political
subdivisions and private parties that act with sufficient authorization
and supervision from the state. The Court’s decision in City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. was instrumental in
refining the doctrine as it applies to states.23 Further, Federal Trade
Commission v. Ticor Title clarified the doctrine’s application to
private parties.24
19. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 55 (refusing to find a “clear articulation and affirmative
expression” where the “State’s position is one of mere neutrality respecting the municipal
actions challenged as anticompetitive”).
20. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1994).
22. The Court has not retreated from its holding in City of Boulder that immunity does not
flow from home rule authority, but subsequent decisions have embraced a generous state action
standard when evaluating non-home rule legislation. See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985) (finding sufficient state authorization as long as the challenged
anticompetitive conduct is a “foreseeable” consequence of the enabling legislation); Southern
Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985) (endorsing a broad
application of the “authorization” requirement by finding a clear state policy to restrict
competition in the existence of a regulatory scheme that established a public service
commission through which motor carrier rates were established).
23. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
24. 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
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B. Political Subdivisions
In 1991 the Supreme Court significantly strengthened the antitrust
immunity afforded to political subdivisions in land use cases with its
broad interpretation of the state action doctrine in City of Columbia v.
Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.25 First, the Court directed that the
proper focus of the state action analysis is limited to whether the state
actually authorized the challenged conduct. Whether a political
subdivision exceeds the limits of that authority is not germane to the
antitrust analysis.26 Second, by eliminating the co-conspirator
exception to state action immunity, 27 Omni cleared the way for a
broader range of municipal conduct to go unchecked by the federal
antitrust laws.
1. Immunity Flows From the States
Omni involved a challenge to a municipal ordinance restricting the
size, location and spacing of billboards. Omni Outdoor Advertising
alleged that the ordinance, which limited the construction of new
billboards, gave an unfair competitive advantage to the Columbia
Outdoor Advertising company, which already had billboards in place.
More specifically, Omni charged that the law was the result of a
conspiracy between the city officials and Columbia Outdoor
Advertising executives to block competitors from the marketplace.
On the question of the state action doctrine, the Court held that the
city was entitled to immunity. It was undisputed that the state
legislature had granted the city statutory authority “to regulate the
size, location, and spacing of billboards.” 28 That the ordinance may
not have technically promoted “health, safety, morals or the general
welfare of the community,” as the statute required, was not fatal to
the doctrine’s application in this case.29 The Court found that the
purposes of the state action doctrine are served once the state
25. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
26. See id. at 372.
27. See id. at 374 (“There is no such conspiracy exception . . . [to the state action
doctrine].”).
28. Id. at 371-72.
29. Id. at 371.
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delegates authority to a municipality by virtue of a clearly articulated
policy to displace competition. To impose the further requirement
that a municipality exercise its authority in substantive and technical
compliance with the law would undermine the foundation of
federalism upon which the doctrine is based, the Court reasoned.30
The Court went on to conclude that the city’s unquestioned zoning
power was sufficient for immunity to attach, because it was
foreseeable that exercise of that power would displace competition.31
Omni portends broad immunity for local governments in the land
use context. Most of the land use regulations and actions that could
be challenged under the antitrust laws, such as rezonings and special
use decisions, are expressly authorized by the Standard Zoning Act
and state zoning legislation.32 Moreover, the Court recognized that
zoning is inherently anticompetitive.33 In doing so the Court indicated
that any “common” form of zoning that limits market entry is entitled
to state action immunity. As long it is “foreseeable” that a local
government will engage in anticompetitive conduct under the
enabling legislation, the local government is not vulnerable to
antitrust attack.
2. The Former Co-Conspirator Exception
The Court further strengthened the immunity available to local
governments in regulating land use interests when it excised the co-
conspirator exception from the state action doctrine. Prior to Omni
several lower courts had refused to grant immunity under the state
action doctrine where local government officials conspired with
private parties to stifle free market competition.34 Those courts found
30. Id. at 372 (“We . . . believe that in order to prevent Parker from undermining the very
interests of federalism it is designed to protect, it is necessary to adopt a concept of authority
broader than what is applied to determine the legality of the municipality’s action under state
law.”).
31. Omni, 499 U.S. at 371 (citing Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42
(1985)).
32. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT
(1926).
33. See Omni, 499 U.S. at 373 (“The very purpose of zoning regulation is to displace
unfettered business freedom in a manner that regularly has the effect of preventing normal acts
of competition, particularly on the part of new entrants.”).
34. See, e.g., Omni Outdoor Advertising Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Advertising, 891 F.2d
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grounds for the exception in Parker, which implied that immunity
would not attach if a state or municipality participated in a private
agreement or combined with others to restrain trade.35 The Omni
Court rejected this analysis, holding instead that Parker “simply
clar[ified] that [state action] immunity does not necessarily obtain
where the State acts not in a regulatory capacity but as a commercial
participant in a given market.”36 The Court went on to reason that a
conspiracy exception would effectively nullify state action immunity
because good government inevitably involves agreements between
public officials and their constituency.37
While Omni left no question about the conspiracy issue, its
rationale created new ambiguity about whether a municipality forfeits
immunity when it acts as a participant in the commercial market
rather than a regulator of it. Since the case did not involve the
question of whether the city was acting as a market participant, the
Court’s interpretation of this issue is not a rule of law. Courts
generally have refused to recognize the market participant exception
in the antitrust context,38 although some scholars think it is inevitable
that it will be recognized in the future.39
1127 (4th Cir.), rev’d, 499 U.S. 365 (1991); Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau,
693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982); Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir.), vacated 435 U.S.
992 (1978).
35. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943) (“[W]e have no question of the
state or its municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement or combination by others
for restraint of trade . . .. The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate program made no
contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish
monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman
Act did not undertake to prohibit.”).
36. Omni, 499 U.S. at 374-75.
37. See id. at 375 (reasoning that a conspiracy exception would make “all anticompetitive
regulation . . . vulnerable to a ‘conspiracy’ charge”).
38. See, e.g., Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Paragould, Ark., 930 F.2d 1310, 1313
(8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the exception is not a rule of law), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 963
(1991); Allright Colorado, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 937 F.2d 1502, 1510 (10th Cir.
1991) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 983 (1993); Limeco, Inc. v. Division of Lime of
Mississippi Dept. of Agric. & Commerce, 778 F.2d 1086, 1087 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding no
commercial exception to the Parker doctrine). But see Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998
F.2d 931, 949 (Fed.Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140 (1994).
39. See Susan Beth Farmer, Balancing State Sovereignty and Competition: An Analysis of
the Impact of Seminole Tribe on the Antitrust State Action Immunity Doctrine, 42 VILL. L. REV.
111, 164 (1997).
Washington University Open Scholarship
p473+Sullivan+Thomas.doc 01/04/01
482 Festschrift [Vol. 3:473
C. Political Subdivisions: Beyond the Paradigm
Municipalities are the paradigm political subdivision. They are the
only non-state entity that the Supreme Court has considered in the
state action context. Nevertheless, other government bodies are
empowered to implement state policy. Accordingly, lower courts
have granted political subdivision status to a number of entities,
including hospital and transit authorities, state bar organizations,
electric cooperatives, and state-created insurance associations.40 The
focus of the inquiry in these cases is whether the entity possesses
sufficient government-like attributes, such that it is unlikely to
engage in any private anticompetitive conduct.41 Factors that are
considered include whether the entity has open records, is tax
exempt, exercises governmental functions, lacks the possibility of
private profit, and is composed such that it looks more like a
governmental unit than a private body.42 If an entity possesses
sufficient non-private attributes, it need only meet the clear
articulation standard of the state action doctrine to be immune from
antitrust attack.
The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, which codifies the
common law state action doctrine, provides some guidance in this
area. The act does not cover states or their agencies with state-wide
jurisdiction because those entities are immunized directly by the state
action doctrine.43 But a political subdivision of the state, which is
established to conduct general or special purpose governmental
functions, is included.44 Examples of special purpose governmental
units include “regional planning boards, environmental organizations,
40. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Florida Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting
Ass’n, 137 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 1998) (listing cases).
41. See id. at 1296.
42. See id. at 1296-97 (citations omitted). See also Commuter Transp. Sys., Inc. v.
Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 801 F.2d 1286, 1290 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding it
relevant to the state action inquiry that “[t]he Authority is subject to state ‘sunshine’ laws, has
police power jurisdiction, power of eminent domain, zoning authority, bonding authority,
rulemaking power and is exempt from taxation”).
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or airport or port authorities.”45 Excluded from that category are
“largely private regulatory bodies that operate with the sanction of a
local government [such as] . . . a county or a city bar association,
dental association, or medical association that regulates entry and
enforces professional ethics.”46 Because the examples provided by
Congress are non-exclusive, whether an entity falls within a
statutorily protected category depends on the particular facts of the
case.47
If an entity is not a political subdivision, it may still be protected
under the state action doctrine if it acts in concert with a municipality
that enjoys immunity. Several circuit and district courts have held
that once a local government is determined to be immune from
antitrust liability, the same protection should be afforded to private
parties acting under its direction.48 Endorsing this view, the Second
Circuit has held that where a private entity is engaged in cooperative
conduct with a municipality and the participation of private parties
was reasonably contemplated by the state legislature, the state need
not supervise the conduct for immunity to attach.49 “Recognizing that
the state action doctrine protects state action, not state actors . . . [,]to
45. Id.
46. Id. at 20.
47. Compare Daniel v. American Bd. of Emergency Med., 988 F. Supp. 127, 194-95
(W.D.N.Y. 1997) (relying on a narrow interpretation of the act to deny protection to a group of
state university-related hospitals and medical centers on grounds that the act is limited to those
entities charged with providing essentially local or regional, as opposed to state-wide, public
services that are funded directly or indirectly by locally generated revenues) with Bloom v.
Hennepin County, 783 F. Supp. 418 (D. Minn. 1992) (finding that the Local Government
Antitrust Act immunized county and private physicians where county gave the physicians an
exclusive contract to service the county-owned hospital).
48. See, e.g., Charley’s Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Hawaii, 810 F.2d 869, 878
(9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting antitrust liability for association of individual taxi owner-operators
that possessed exclusive franchise to provide taxi service where state department of
transportation had been granted state action immunity to grant franchise); Cine 42nd Street
Theater Corp. v. Nederlander Org., 790 F.2d 1032, 1048 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding private parties
immune where they acted in concert with urban development corporation that was protected
under the state action doctrine; the court did not conduct a separate state action analysis for
private parties); City Communications, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 660 F. Supp. 932, 935 (E.D.
Mich. 1987) (“Once it is determined that the municipality is entitled to immunity from the
antitrust laws, the private parties who are regulated by the municipality are also entitled to
immunity as long as the ‘effective decision maker’ is the municipality rather than the private
parties.”).
49. See Cine 42nd Street Theatre Corp., 790 F.2d at 1047-48.
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allow suits against private parties for actions immunized as to
municipalities would allow plaintiffs to circumvent the state action
doctrine and challenge protected municipal decisions through artful
pleading.”50
If an entity does not qualify as a political subdivision in its own
right and does not act in concert with a municipality that is protected
under the state action doctrine, immunity is not foreclosed. State
action immunity is available to private parties whose conduct is
authorized and also closely supervised by the state.
D. Private Parties
Although the state action doctrine was conceived in the context of
traditional state actors, it soon became evident that immunity extends
to qualified private parties who are authorized to implement a state’s
clearly expressed policy to displace competition.51 Because private
parties are not politically accountable in the same manner as
traditional political subdivisions, however, an additional requirement
of “active supervision” is imposed where the challenged conduct
exclusively involves private parties.52 What satisfies the “active
supervision” requirement was most recently addressed in Federal
Trade Commission v. Ticor Title.53
50. Bloom, 783 F. Supp. at 427 (extending state action immunity from state governmental
unit to private party).
51. The Court’s decisions in Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, when read together, hold that
state action immunity may apply to private parties when their action is pursuant to a clearly
authorized state policy to displace competition and is supervised by state entities. “If Parker
immunity were limited to the actions of public officials . . . a state would be unable to
implement programs that restrain competition among private parties. A plaintiff could frustrate
any such program merely by filing suit against the regulated private parties, rather than the state
officials who implement the plan.” Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United
States, 471 U.S. 48, 56-57 (1985).
52. The Court first articulated the two-prong standard in California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), but denied immunity in that case because
the challenged conduct was not supervised by the state. Five years later the Court for the first
time conferred state action immunity on private parties who met the two-pronged standard. See
Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, 471 U.S. at 64. The test is designed to determine
whether a private party is acting as an instrument of the state, or whether that individual or
entity is hiding behind a “gauzy cloak” of state involvement to pursue anticompetitive private
interests antithetical to the antitrust laws. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 106.
53. 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
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Ticor Title was handed down in the wake of City of Columbia v.
Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., a decision that reflected the Court’s
growing reluctance to impose federal antitrust laws in areas that are
regulated by the states.54 Ticor Title did not deviate from this trend,
but it did signal that states must carefully scrutinize the conduct of
private parties before immunity will extend to non-governmental
bodies. Such scrutiny is warranted to ensure that private
anticompetitive behavior does not go unchecked “under the auspices
of state law.”55
At issue in Ticor Title was the “negative option” system where
fees for title examinations and searches were set by private
companies and approved by the state.56 Under this system private
insurance companies would submit rate filings to state rate bureaus,
which in turn had the option to reject the rates within a thirty-day
period. If the state bureau did not object, the rates became effective.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) alleged that the process
amounted to private horizontal price fixing by the insurance
companies. The insurance companies claimed state action immunity
on grounds that the states authorized and supervised the challenged
conduct by virtue of regulatory programs that were staffed, funded,
and empowered by state law.57
Rejecting the state action defense in this context, the Court
distinguished between a system that meets the two-pronged standard
in theory and one that does so in fact. In short, the mere potential for
state oversight is inadequate. For a private party to avail itself of the
state action doctrine, the challenged conduct must be subject to
comprehensive, independent control by the state.58 Such a rigorous
standard is warranted because of the “real danger” that private parties
will act to further their own economic objectives, in lieu of the state’s
broader governmental interests.59 The “active supervision”
requirement serves to accommodate states’ sovereign right to regulate
54. See 499 U.S. 365 (1991). See also supra Part I.B (discussing Omni’s impact on state
action analysis).
55. Ticor Title, 504 U.S. at 633.
56. See id. at 629.
57. See id. at 636.
58. See id. at 633.
59. See id. at 634 (citing Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 100-01 (1988)).
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their own affairs while ensuring political accountability where private
parties are authorized to implement a state policy to displace
competition.60
E. Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984
The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 was enacted in the
wake of City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.61 and
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,62 which
established that local governments could be sued for anticompetitive
conduct. In City of Boulder the Court opined that since the legislative
history of the Sherman Act was silent on whether Congress intended
local governments to be subject to the law’s anticompetitive mandate,
Congress’ “long-standing . . . commitment to the policy of free
markets and open competition embodied in the antitrust laws” should
prevail.63 The result threatened financial ruin to municipalities, which
until that point had not anticipated antitrust litigation either in
shaping their conduct or planning their budgets.64
Congress’ response to this crisis is embodied in the Local
Government Antitrust Act, which serves to simultaneously eliminate
the threat of financial ruin and preserve the competitive objectives of
the federal antitrust laws.65 In the act Congress for the first time
60. Ticor Title, 504 U.S. at 635.
61. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
62. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
63. Id. at 56.
64. See Carol F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Responses
to Supreme Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URB. LAW. 309-10 (1988). Within
two years of Boulder the threat became a reality, with two to three hundred antitrust lawsuits
pending against municipalities. Id. (citing The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1983,
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 578, 98th Cong. 61 (1984) (statement
of Mayor Althaus of York, Pennsylvania, on behalf of U.S. Conference of Mayors)). In one suit
a jury in federal district court in Illinois awarded a private developer $28.5 million in treble
damages against Lake County, the Village of Grayslake, and three local officials for alleged
anticompetitive conduct in a dispute over sewer connections. Id. The damages amounted to
sixty times the total property tax collected in the previous year by the Village of Grayslake and
one and a half times the amount collected by Lake County. Id. (citing 130 CONG. REC. H5037
(daily ed. May 31, 1984) (remarks of Rep. Fish)).
65. The Senate Report concluded that legislation was necessary to “allow local
governments to go about their daily functions without the paralyzing fear of antitrust lawsuits.”
S. REP. NO. 98-593, at 3 (1984). Both the House and the Senate, however, were careful to note
that the immunity provided in the act was immunity from suits for damages and not immunity
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confirmed that local governments do come within the jurisdiction of
the federal antitrust laws, both civil and criminal, and that the Federal
Trade Commission has authority to sue.66 The act also codifies the
judicially created state action doctrine, immunizing from monetary
damage suits “any official action directed by a local government, or
official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity.”67 Under
the act remedies are limited to injunctive relief.68
Throughout the act, Congress facilitated a compromise between
the competing policies behind federalism and the federal antitrust
laws. By providing federal antitrust jurisdiction for injunctive relief
over local government activities, Congress came down on the side of
free and open market competition. At the same time, federalism was
served by respecting the decision-making functions of state and local
governments. In practice, however, it appears that the goals of
federalism have prevailed. The formidable defenses available to
government defendants, coupled with the burden of stating a claim
for equitable relief, has proven almost insurmountable for antitrust
plaintiffs in the local government arena.69
Congress intended that the plaintiff’s burden in bringing an
injunctive suit “readjust the litigation advantages and disadvantages
more equitably for local government defendants“ and deter frivolous
actions.70 Accordingly, injunction actions under the antitrust laws are
to be treated in the federal courts in the same way as other equitable
actions within the district court’s jurisdiction.71 Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff must show (1) immediate or
irreparable harm and (2) probable success on the merits.72 In a suit for
from suits seeking injunctive relief. Id. at 5-6; H.R. REP. NO. 98-965, at 2, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4602, 4603.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 34.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 36(a). Importantly, state action immunity trumps the protection afforded
by the act. If there is overlap, the state action doctrine precludes both damage and injunctive
suits.
68. See id. For a discussion of whether the strict statutory requirements of section 4 of the
Clayton Act and its case law apply to private parties seeking injunctive relief under section 16,
see DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., FEDERAL LAND USE LAW § 13.04[4] (1998).
69. See infra Part V.
70. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-965, at 18-19 (1984).
71. See S. REP. NO. 98-593, at 6 (1984).
72. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65. See also H.R. REP. NO. 98-965, at 18-19 (1984) (stating that
injunction actions under the antitrust laws are to be treated in the federal courts in the same way
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equitable relief, the focus of remedy changes from compensating for
past damages to preventing future injury. The prospective nature of
behavioral remedies places a substantial burden on the plaintiff at the
outset of the action since, “[l]ogically, ‘a prospective remedy will
provide no relief for an injury that is, and likely will remain, entirely
in the past.’”73
By changing the remedial nature of the antitrust laws in the local
government context, the act has given rise to new trends in antitrust
litigation strategies. First, certain defenses available to local
governments have taken on heightened importance, while the
efficacy of other defenses has been brought into question.74 Second,
although plaintiffs are foreclosed from monetary relief under the
antitrust laws, they are not precluded from bringing alternative claims
that might afford financial restitution for economic harm suffered.75
As a result, plaintiffs who seek economic restitution for
anticompetitive harms must employ alternative legal theories to
achieve that end.76
II. BEYOND STATE ACTION IMMUNITY: OTHER DEFENSES AGAINST
MUNICIPAL ANTITRUST LIABILITY
Although state action immunity is the primary defense with which
a political subdivision or qualified private party is likely to shield its
anticompetitive conduct, those parties also may avail themselves of
other defenses against antitrust claims.
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment presumes states are immune from suit
brought by private parties unless the state consents or Congress
“unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity” and
as other equitable actions within the district court’s jurisdiction).
73. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting American
Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 968 F.2d 1373, 1376 (1st Cir. 1992)).
74. See infra Part IV (discussing defenses).
75. H.R. REP. NO. 98965, at 19 (1984).
76. See infra Part IV (discussing RICO as an alternative theory).
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has acted “pursuant to a valid exercise of power.”77 In addition to
protecting states, Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to
entities created by state governments that operate as instrumentalities
of the state.78 Notably, this immunity does not extend to protect the
activities of municipalities.79 Nevertheless, “[b]etween arms of the
state and local municipalities . . . lies a wide range of unconventional
government-chartered entities that possess attributes of both political
subdivisions and state agencies.”80 This creates fertile ground for the
Eleventh Amendment to emerge as a shield against antitrust
immunity where state action immunity is not available.
The formidable strength of Eleventh Amendment immunity is a
relatively recent phenomenon that began with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.81 Seminole Tribe
held that the Commerce Clause does not serve as a source for
Congress to validly abrogate states’ sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, Congress’ ability to trump
Eleventh Amendment immunity is severely limited to where it acts
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure states’
compliance with the Federal Constitution.82
77. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). The Eleventh
Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
78. See State Highway Comm’n v. Utah Constr. Co., 278 U.S. 194, 199 (1929) (noting
that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes state agency that was “but the arm or alter ego of the
State”). The rationale extending Eleventh Amendment immunity is that when a state entity is
sued, the state is the “real, substantial party in interest.” Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). Accordingly, a plaintiff who successfully sued
an arm of the state would have a judgment with “the same effect as if it were rendered against
the State for the amount specified in the complaint.” Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 439
(1900).
79. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that constitutional sovereign
immunity does not protect municipalities and other local entities that are not arms of the state);
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does
not protect counties from suit in federal court).
80. See Alex E. Rogers, Clothing State Governmental Entities with Sovereign Immunity:
Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1243
(1992).
81. 517 U.S. 44 (1997).
82. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (stating that the proper inquiry is
whether Congress was acting to remedy or prevent Fourteenth Amendment (constitutional)
violations).
Washington University Open Scholarship
p473+Sullivan+Thomas.doc 01/04/01
490 Festschrift [Vol. 3:473
During the 1998-99 term, the Court continued to expand the
immunity afforded to states under the Eleventh Amendment. In what
has been dubbed the “federalism trilogy” the Court held that states
are immune from suits by private individuals in state court except in
rare situations where the state has expressly waived its immunity.83 In
federal court citizens are precluded from suing states unless Congress
has enacted a valid law to enforce the provisions of the 14th
Amendment.84 The Court will decide at least three more Eleventh
Amendment cases in its current term, which are likely to provide
further guidance on whether and when federal antitrust laws permeate
state boundaries to reach subdivisions of the state.85
B. Rule of Reason
The rule of reason is an analytical approach to antitrust problems,
not a defense to an antitrust claim. Nevertheless, it provides
defendants with the opportunity to justify their anticompetitive
83. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
84. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627 (invalidating 35
U.S.C. § 271(h), which provided that “[a]ny State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or
employee, shall be subject [in federal court] to the provisions of [the Patent Act] in the same
manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity”); College Savings Bank, 527
U.S. 666 (1999) (invalidating a similar provision in the Trademark Act).
85. See United States v. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d 195 (2d Cir.
1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999) (presenting the issue of whether a private citizen is
precluded by the Eleventh Amendment from bringing a federal qui tam suit in federal court
against a state agency under the federal False Claims Act); Condon v. Reno, 155 F.3d 453 (4th
Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999) (posing the issue of whether Congress
exceeded its authority in enacting the Drivers Privacy Protection Act, which regulates the
dissemination and use of information contained in state motor vehicle records); Kimel v.
Florida Board of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999)
(asking the Court to decide whether Congress properly exercised its Fourteenth Amendment,
section 5 power when it made the Age Discrimination in Employment Act applicable to the
states). Although none of these cases addresses the federal antitrust laws applicability to the
states, at least two lower courts have questioned the distinction between state action immunity
and the immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment. See Neo Gen. Screening Inc. v. New
England Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment protected the University of Massachusetts and its affiliated programs from antitrust
suits); Walker v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 24 F. Supp. 2d 803, 806 (W.D. Mich. 1998)
(holding that as an “integral state agency,” the Michigan Public Service Commission, charged
with operating a monopoly, is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment).
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conduct in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the
challenged conduct. The Court has indicated that a special rule of
reason analysis might apply to municipalities. Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder suggested that “certain
activities, which might appear anticompetitive when engaged in by
private parties, take on a different complexion when adopted by a
local government.”86 The Court noted that forcing a municipality to
rigidly comply with the pro-competitive policies of the Sherman Act
would all but destroy innovative social programs at the local level.87
City of Boulder did not decide whether a special rule of reason should
apply in the local government context, but its reasoning is supported
by a long history of antitrust jurisprudence. Prior to the 1970s the
Supreme Court’s definition of competition focused on distributive
questions, including fairness and equality, not whether there was
efficient distribution of resources.88
The analytical framework according to which the court proceeds
is particularly relevant to zoning, since zoning regulations are
inherently anticompetitive.89 If state action immunity fails and the
antitrust analysis is narrowly confined to determining the economic
consequence of the land use regulation,90 then most zoning
ordinances may be struck down under the antitrust laws. If, however,
the antitrust analysis allows a broad examination of the public
policies served by the ordinance, then zoning ordinances that produce
a net community benefit will likely survive the antitrust challenge.91
86. 455 U.S. 40, 55-56 n.20 (1982) (citing City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 398, 417 n.48 (1978)).
87. See id. at 67.
88. See MANDELKER, supra note 68, § 10.2.
89. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373 (1991)
(“The very purpose of zoning regulation is to displace unfettered business freedom in a manner
that regularly has the effect of preventing normal acts of competition, particularly on the part of
new entrants.”).
90. See generally National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696
(1978) (limiting rule of reason analysis to economic considerations).
91. See MANDELKER, supra note 68, § 10.2.
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C. Equal Fault Doctrines: In Pari Delicto and Unclean Hands
By substituting injunctive relief for treble damages, the Local
Government Antitrust Act renewed the possibility of other defenses
that were previously considered to be foreclosed in the antitrust
context. In pari delicto, or “of equal fault,” is a common law defense
that bars a plaintiff from recovering damages where she has
participated in the challenged practice.92 In Perma Life Mufflers, Inc.
v. International Parts Corp., the Court held that in pari delicto was
not a viable defense to an action for treble damages under the
antitrust laws.93 Five justices, writing separately, agreed that although
the concept of equal fault is narrowly applied under federal
regulatory statutes, the defense should be recognized in antitrust
litigation where a plaintiff truly bears at least substantially equal
responsibility for the violation.94
Because there was no clear majority holding in Perma Life,
whether the in pari delicto defense is appropriate in an antitrust action
for equitable relief is an open question. The issue illustrates the
tension between the federalism underpinnings of the state action
doctrine and Local Government Antitrust Act, on one hand, and the
federal antitrust policy of deterrence on the other. Allowing the
defense would strengthen government actors’ immunity to the
antitrust laws and dilute the federal policy of deterring
anticompetitive conduct. Disallowing the defense would promote
deterrence and promote equitable suits where allowed under the
Local Government Antitrust Act.
Unclean hands, or the “innocent party” requirement, is the
92. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1985)
(explaining history of the doctrine and its present-day application); Milton Handler & Ira S.
Saks, The Continued Vitality of In Pari Delicto as an Antitrust Defense, 70 GEO. L.J. 1123,
1130 (1982) (same).
93. According to the Court, “[t]here is nothing in the language of the antitrust acts which
indicates that Congress wanted to make the common-law in pari delicto doctrine a defense to
treble-damage actions.” Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
138 (1968).
94. See id. at 145 (White, J., concurring); id. at 147-48 (Fortas, J., concurring in result);
id. at 148-149 (Marshall, J., concurring in result); id. at 154-55 (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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equitable counterpart to the doctrine of in pari delicto.95 Unclean
hands is distinct, however, because it is only a defense in equity.96
Moreover, it can be raised where the plaintiff’s misconduct is only
generally related to the suit, as opposed to in pari delicto, which only
applies where the defendant has equal involvement in the precise
illegality that is the subject of the plaintiff’s suit.97 In Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., the Court held that the
plaintiff’s unclean hands did not relieve the defendant of liability for
price-fixing in violation of the antitrust laws.98 But Kiefer-Stewart,
like Perma-Life, was a treble damage action and thus did not resolve
whether the defense remains viable in a claim for equitable relief.
The viability of the unclean hands defense also brings competing
policies of federalism and antitrust to bear.
D. First Amendment: Overbroad Remedial Orders
The regulation of conduct, which is the focus of injunctive suits,
triggers a heightened awareness of the intersection between
injunctive orders and the First Amendment. At bottom, the Supreme
Court’s opinions in the commercial speech arena teach that antitrust
orders may regulate economic conduct that facilitates an antitrust
violation, but such orders may not run afoul of protections afforded to
such speech by the First Amendment.99 Accordingly, antitrust
counsel must consider new developments in commercial speech law
to determine (1) whether and under what circumstances a remedial
order can restrict economic conduct which arguably comes within the
commercial speech doctrine, (2) whether any principles delimit the
“illegal conduct” exception to the commercial speech defense, and
95. See Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 82
(1993).
96. See Handler & Saks, supra note 92 (explaining the distinctions between the two
defenses).
97. See id.
98. See 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951) (“If [plaintiff] and others were guilty of infractions of
the antitrust laws, they could be held responsible in appropriate proceedings brought against
them by the Government or by injured private persons. The alleged illegal conduct of
[plaintiff], however, could not legalize the unlawful combination by respondents nor immunize
them against liability to those they injured.”).
99. See generally E.THOMAS. SULLIVAN & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY
AND PROCEDURE ch. 3 (4th ed. 1999).
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(3) whether traditional standards of overbreadth analysis and
vagueness are applicable.100
Whether a judicial or regulatory order is constitutionally
overbroad is decided by the standard set forth in Central Hudson Gas
& Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.101 The Central
Hudson test states that the government may regulate commercial
speech that is acceptable and unrelated to legal conduct102 if it
concerns a substantial government interest, if the regulation advances
directly the stated governmental interest, and if the restriction is no
broader than necessary to serve the governmental interest.103 The
requirement that the restriction be no broader than necessary has been
the focus of the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence in this area.
The Court first elaborated on the “no broader than necessary”
requirement in Board of Trustees of State University of New York v.
Fox.104 Rejecting that the government regulation be the least
restrictive means to the desired objective, the Court instead embraced
the requirement that there be a reasonable “fit” between the stated
goal and the regulation designed to achieve it.105 More recently, the
viability of the Central Hudson test was brought into question with
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, which suggested the Court would
consider a new, and stricter, rule protecting commercial speech.106 In
its most recent term, the Court in New Orleans Broadcasting
Association v. United States, acknowledged criticism of the Central
Hudson test, but went on to reaffirm its primacy.107 For now it
appears that the Central Hudson test remains the standard by which
remedial orders affecting commercial speech will be judged.
100. See id. at 162.
101. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
102. Speech that is inaccurate or related to illegal conduct is entitled to little constitutional
protection. See E. Thomas Sullivan, First Amendment Defenses in Antitrust Litigation, 46 MO.
L. REV. 517, 538-39 (1981).
103. See id.
104. 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
105. See id.
106. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
107. See 119 S. Ct. 1923 (1999) (Justice Thomas declined to reaffirm the test.).
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III. NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE
Private parties have an important role in the development and
enactment of municipal regulations. As a result, private parties may
be implicated when such regulations yield anticompetitive results
that, for example, exclude competitors. The judicially created Noerr-
Pennington doctrine is premised on the constitutional theory that the
activities of those who petition their local government for changes in
laws and regulations constitute protected free speech.108 Like the state
action doctrine, Noerr-Pennington recognizes that the antitrust laws,
“tailored as they are for the business world, are not at all appropriate
for application in the political arena.”109 Accordingly, the doctrine
immunizes private petitioners from antitrust liability, even where
their political actions are motivated by anticompetitive intent.110
Until recently the extent of that protection was limited by a
number of exceptions. The Supreme Court’s opinion in City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. eliminated a major
exception and brought the efficacy of others into question.111 With
the exception of sham proceedings, it now appears that individuals
have a virtually unfettered right to petition their local governments
for a particular political outcome, even when there objective is
anticompetitive, without coming within the scope of the federal
antitrust laws.
A. The Former Co-Conspirator Exception
Prior to 1991 Noerr-Pennington immunity was jeopardized when
private parties conspired with government officials to thwart
108. The genesis of Noerr-Pennington immunity is found in Eastern Railroad President’s
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (finding that antitrust laws are
directed only to private trade restraints not conduct undertaken as a result of valid government
action) and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (“Joint efforts to
influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate
competition.”).
109. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 141.
110. See Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670 (“Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted
effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose.”).
111. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
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competition in the open market.112 Courts that recognized the
exception reasoned that conspiratorial activity between a local
government and members of its constituency should not enjoy
constitutional protection.113 The primacy of the First Amendment
right to petition, coupled with the policy of federalism that protects
states’ right to govern, ultimately led to the demise of the co-
conspirator exception to Noerr-Pennington.
In Omni the Court rejected the conspiracy exception to Noerr-
Pennington on the same grounds that it rejected the exception to the
state action doctrine. Reasoning that the two doctrines “are
complementary expressions of the principle that the antitrust laws
regulate business, not politics,” the Court found it would be
incongruous to bar the conspiracy exception from one but not the
other.114 Essentially, a conspiracy exception would bar First
Amendment protections whenever a private party was successful in
petitioning a local government to a particular end.115 Even if
unlawfulness is a factor in such an exchange, the Court concluded
that other laws are better suited to regulate such conduct.116
B. Illegal or Fraudulent Acts Exception
Omni also indirectly questions the continuing viability of the
illegal or fraudulent acts exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity.
That exception, which has been embraced by the Eighth Circuit,
holds that where conduct exceeds the scope of “traditional political
activity,” Noerr-Pennington protection is not available.117 Other
courts are less inclined to embrace the exception and hold that
immunity applies to “any petitioning activity designed to influence
112. See, e.g., Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435 U.S. 992
(1978), aff’d on rehearing, 576 F.2d 696 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979).
113. See id.
114. See Omni, 499 U.S. at 383.
115. See supra Part I.B.2 (explaining Omni’s rejection of the conspirator exception to the
state action doctrine).
116. See Omni, 499 U.S. at 378-79 (suggesting the Hobbs Act as one example of a law
better suited to deal with illegal petitioning activity).
117. See Westborough Mall v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied sub nom., Drury v. Westborough Mall, Inc., 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
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legislative bodies or governmental agencies.”118 The issue may now
be moot if the same logic used by the Omni Court to reject the
conspiracy exception applies with equal force here. Conceding that
unlawful acts may violate the principles of good government, the
Court was unwilling to apply the antitrust laws to condemn such
behavior.119 Nevertheless, when the Court was presented with an
opportunity to directly eliminate the illegal acts exception two years
later, it declined to do so in favor of analyzing the alleged
anticompetitive behavior as a “sham.”120
C. Sham Exception
Activity that constitutes “a mere sham to cover what is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor” is not protected under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine.121 The sham exception has been accepted
widely in land use cases. It is likely to be found where private
defendants abuse the petitioning process to create access barriers for
other competitors before public agencies or courts.122 In its broadest
application the sham exception can preclude immunity any time a
party is successful at blocking “fair and impartial consideration” of a
competitor’s request for action by a city.123 This might include (1)
secretly funding a massive publicity campaign to arouse citizens’
opposition to a shopping center development, (2) soliciting and
118. See North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 666 F.2d
50, 52 (4th Cir. 1981). See also Lockary v. Kayfetz, 587 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
(upholding immunity where petitioning activity was designed to influence government zoning
decision-making).
119. See Omni, 499 U.S. at 78-79.
120. See Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508
U.S. 49, 61 n.6 (1993) (“We need not decide here whether and, if so, to what extent Noerr
permits the imposition of antitrust liability for a litigant’s fraud or other misrepresentations.”).
121. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
144 (1961).
122. See, e.g., Miracle Mile Assoc. v. City of Rochester, 617 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1980)
(“[A]ccess-barring is the cornerstone to the sham exception.”). See also Kottle v. Northwest
Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding a higher tolerance for sham activity in the
legislative than judicial arena).
123. See Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1567-68 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied sub nom., Gulf Coast Cable Television Co. v. Affiliated Capital Corp., 474
U.S. 1053 (1986).
Washington University Open Scholarship
p473+Sullivan+Thomas.doc 01/04/01
498 Festschrift [Vol. 3:473
subsidizing opposition before public agencies, (3) filing appeals
without standing, and (4) requesting delays for the purpose of
protracting the proceedings.124
Although it remains a viable exception to Noerr-Pennington
immunity, the sham exception did not escape Omni’s narrowing
analytical sweep. In addressing the extent to which the sham activity
experience pierced Noerr-Pennington immunity, the Court limited
the exception to those activities that are designed solely to thwart the
political process with no genuine expectation of success.125 Activities
designed to effectuate a particular outcome remain protected under
Noerr-Pennington.126 In making this distinction, the Court implied
that whether Noerr-Pennington immunity applies depends on the
defendant’s ultimate intent in undertaking the allegedly
anticompetitive activity. However, the Court failed to direct whether
objective or subjective motivation was the standard.
Two years later in Professional Real Estate Investor’s, Inc. (PRE)
v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. the Court picked up where it left
off in Omni and addressed the issue of “intent” for purposes of the
sham exception.127 PRE eschewed a subjective construction of sham
conduct and instead devised an objective reasonableness test for
assessing sham activity. “If an objective participant could conclude
that [a government petition] is reasonably calculated to elicit a
favorable outcome,” Noerr-Pennington immunity is available.128 But
if the activity is baseless and merely constitutes “an attempt to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor . . .
through the use [of] the governmental process – as opposed to the
outcome of that process,” then immunity fails.129
124. See Landmarks Holding Corp. v. Bermant, 664 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981).
125. See Omni, 499 U.S. at 380. Purely process-oriented behavior includes when the
petitioning party acts merely to inconvenience its competitor. An example is when a party
engages in litigation not to win the suit, but merely to force its competitor to waste resources in
defending itself. See Video Intern. Prod., Inc. v. Warner-Amex Cable Communications, Inc.,
858 F.2d 1075, 1082 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining this hypothetical).
126. See Omni, 499 U.S. at 380.
127. 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
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D. Commercial Dealing Exception
While political activity enjoys wide latitude under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, those who transact with a municipality that acts
“as a commercial participant in a given market” may not be
protected.130 Here, Omni suggested— but did not confirm— a market
participant exception to the state action doctrine.131 If this reasoning
extends to private parties who deal with the municipality in its market
capacity, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine may fail to provide
protection.
The viability of the commercial dealing exception remains unclear
for a number of reasons. First, Noerr-Pennington and state action are
distinct doctrines that do not necessarily warrant parallel reasoning.
Second, a circuit split on the issue remains unresolved. The First
Circuit originally endorsed the exception thirty years ago, reasoning
that when a municipality acts as a commercial proprietor it is acting
outside of the political sphere and therefore, the parties with whom it
transacts are not eligible for Noerr-Pennington protection.132 Other
circuits reject the exception, reasoning that municipalities acting in
the commercial marketplace are merely implementing government
policy, and therefore the rationale for Noerr-Pennington immunity
applies.133 Finally, the Supreme Court’s free speech jurisprudence has
broadened the protection of commercial speech, which also may
weaken the reasoning underlying the commercial exception.134
130. Omni, 499 U.S. at 374-75.
131. The Court in Omni twice mentioned the possibility of a market participant exception
to state action immunity: “[T]his immunity does not necessarily obtain where the State acts not
in a regulatory capacity but as a commercial participant in a given market . . . . We reiterate
that, with the possible market participant exception, any action that qualifies as state action is
‘ipso facto’ . . . ‘exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws.’” Omni, 499 U.S. at 374-75.
132. See George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
133. See, e.g., In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 693 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied sub. nom., Budget Rent-A-Car, Inc., v. Hertz Corp. 462 U.S. 1133 (1983)
(concluding that “[t]here is no commercial exception to Noerr-Pennington,” but acknowledging
that the nature of government activity is one factor in determining the type of public input
acceptable to the particular decision-making process at issue).
134. See supra Part II.C (discussing First Amendment protections of commercial speech).
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E. Private Standard Setting
Private standard setting arises where industry standards are set by
a trade association or similar group comprised on non-governmental
actors. Because state and local governments routinely adopt these
standards with little or no change, the question arises whether Noerr-
Pennington serves to protect the private group’s activities or third
parties who petition the group for a particular outcome in the
standard setting process. In response to this issue, the Court in Allied
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., distinguished
“anticompetitive political activity that is immunized despite its
commercial impact from anticompetitive commercial activity that is
unprotected despite its political impact.”135
The Court in Allied Tube was concerned that there was no official
authority conferred on the trade association at issue and no political
safeguards to prevent private interests from manipulating the process
to anticompetitive ends.136 Concluding that the trade association was
not a “quasi-legislative” body with the political safeguards of a
government body, the Court found that Noerr-Pennington did not
protect those private parties who acted to influence the association’s
standard setting process.137 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court
cautioned that immunity “depends on the context and nature of the
activity.”138 Ultimately, for Noerr-Pennington to apply in the private
standard setting context, the government must delegate official duties
to the group and those exercising decision making authority must not
have economic motivations or bias in the outcome of the process.139
Even where the government has not sanctioned the standard
setting group, Noerr-Pennington immunity may still be available if
the government adopts the group’s recommendations. Here,
135. 486 U.S. 492, 507-08 n.10 (1988). The case arose when members of the steel industry
packed an annual meeting of the National Fire Protection Association with new members solely
to vote against a new type of electrical conduit that posed an economic threat to steel conduit.
See id. at 495-97.
136. See Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 509.
137. See id. at 501. The Court, in holding that petitioners were not immune under Noerr-
Pennington, stated that “this is itself a case close to the line” between anticompetitive political
activity and anticompetitive commercial activity. See id.
138. Id. at 508 n.10.
139. See MANDELKER, supra note 68, at § 13.06[1][e].
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resourceful defendants may argue successfully that the plaintiff’s
damages or injuries arise from or were caused by direct governmental
action, not the private standard-setting process.140 Once the claim
challenges governmental conduct, the state action doctrine protects
the government unit and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine shields the
private standard setting group that acted to influence the
government’s decisions.
F. Means/Objective Test
Traditionally, Noerr-Pennington serves to protect defendants who
use political means, such as lobbying, to achieve political ends. Until
the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Trade Commission v.
Superior Trial Lawyers Association,141 it was unclear whether
immunity was available where defendants use economic means, such
as an economic boycott, to influence the political process.142 At issue
in Superior Trial Lawyers was whether a group of public defenders
violated the antitrust laws when they organized and participated in a
boycott aimed at achieving increased compensation from the
municipal government of Washington, D.C.
The Court rejected a First Amendment exception to the rule that
economic boycotts are per se illegal.143 Although it acknowledged
that “[e]very concerted refusal to do business . . . has an expressive
140. See Massachusetts School of Law v. American Bar Ass’n, 107 F. 3d 1026 (3d Cir.
1997). The Massachusetts School of Law (MSL) claimed that the American Bar Association
(ABA) and related organizations violated the Sherman Act by combining and conspiring to
organize and enforce a group boycott and by conspiring to monopolize legal education, law
school accreditation, and the licensing of lawyers. See id. To the extent that MSL’s alleged
antitrust injury arose from the inability of its graduates to take state bar examinations, the court
found such injury to be the result of state action not private conduct by the ABA. See id. at
1036. The court noted that in the state bar admission requirements the states do adopt and give
effect to the ABA’s accreditation process results. See id. Nevertheless, the court held that the
states are sovereign in imposing such requirements and accordingly are protected by the state
action doctrine. See id. See alsoSessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Manufacturing, Inc., 17 F.3d
295 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that although defendant convinced trade association to enact
restrictive trade standards, the plaintiff’s ultimate injury flowed from the government’s
enforcement of the standards, where application of Noerr-Pennington is proper).
141. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
142. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Missouri v. National
Org. for Women, Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980).
143. See 493 U.S. at 428-32.
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component,” the Court concluded that to allow a First Amendment
exception for restraints of trade “would create a gaping hole in the
fabric of [the antitrust laws].”144 According to the Court, the public
defenders’ economic boycott did not warrant First Amendment
protection because their boycott was the means by which they
petitioned the government, rather than the end goal of their
petitioning activities.145 By contrast, in Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., the petitioning activities
were protected because they were designed to influence the
legislature to impose competitive restraints.146 The Court went on to
distinguish the public defenders’ conduct from the boycotters in
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., where the boycotters “sought no
special advantage for themselves.” 147 The objective of the public
defenders’ boycott, by contrast, was an economic advantage driven
by economic means.148
IV. RICO
In enacting the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984,
Congress encouraged plaintiffs to seek economic redress under
alternate legal theories.149 The Racketeering Influenced and
Corruption Organizations Act (RICO)150 offers plaintiffs the
opportunity to bypass the challenges posed by the strengthened state
action and Noerr-Pennington doctrines and recover monetary relief
for anticompetitive harms. Although the statute was originally
conceived to fight organized crime, it has proven useful in combating
anticompetitive activities in other arenas, as well.
RICO prohibits any “person” from conducting the affairs of any
“enterprise” through a “pattern of racketeering activity.”151
Racketeering activity, otherwise known as predicate acts, range from
144. Id. at 431.
145. Id. at 424-25.
146. 493 U.S. at 424-45.
147. See id. at 426.
148. See id. See also E.T. SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 69 (3d ed. 1998).
149. See H.R. REP. NO. 965, 98th Cong. 19 (1984).
150. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
151. Id. §§ 1961, 1962.
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traditional racketeering offenses152 to bribery,153 mail and wire
fraud,154 and extortion.155 Two or more related predicate acts that
occur within ten years of each other are required to establish the
requisite “pattern.”156 Where a plaintiff establishes that it was harmed
by the defendant’s conduct in this manner, civil remedies may
include treble damages and attorneys fees.157
RICO presents major advantages to antitrust plaintiffs that pursue
economic relief. Significant issues of standing, proof, and local
government immunity that are problematic for plaintiffs under the
federal antitrust laws are eliminated under RICO. Municipalities are
not left defenseless against a RICO claim, however, and formidable
challenges have arisen that may preclude RICO from reaching the
activities of local governments.
A. Advantages to Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs claiming indirect injury from price-fixing schemes do
not state a claim for relief under the federal antitrust laws,158 but the
so-called direct injury requirement does not apply to RICO
plaintiffs.159 Under RICO the traditional proximate cause analysis
applies such that either direct or indirect injury by predicate acts
gives rise to standing.160 Nevertheless, limitations remain. For
instance, “harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a
third party by the defendant’s acts is too remote” to state a claim.161
Moreover, some circuits refuse to apply the more liberal proximate
cause analysis to the entire statute. The Second Circuit has held that
section 1962 of the act, which forbids a person who has received
152. Id. § 1961(1)(A).
153. Id. § 201 (1994 & 1996 Supp.).
154. Id. §§ 1341, 1343 (1994).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1951.
156. Id. § 1961(5).
157. Id. § 1962. Although a majority of courts do not allow for injunctive relief under
RICO, there is not unanimity on the matter. See, e.g., Chambers Dev. Co., Inc. v. Brownning-
Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1540-41 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
158. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
159. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); American Nat’l Bank
and Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
160. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497.
161. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
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income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity “to use or
invest . . . any part of such income” and requires the injury to result
from the defendant’s investment of racketeering income.162 The
Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, takes a more liberal stance and
merely requires the plaintiff to allege a pattern of racketeering
activity along with the investment of the income derived from that
activity.163 The injury need not result from the investment.164 Unless
the Supreme Court rules otherwise, the Second Circuit’s reasoning
should not prove to be an insurmountable barrier to stating a RICO
claim.
A second advantage is RICO’s more inclusive definition of
conspirators. Under the antitrust laws a corporation and its wholly
owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring within the meaning of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.165 That restriction may not be present
under RICO, where two circuits have held that a corporation and its
wholly owned subsidiary can act in concert to violate RICO.166
Accordingly, a municipal corporation and its governing body could
be charged with concerted activity in violation of RICO, thus
circumventing the intra-corporate conspiracy problem encountered in
traditional antitrust pleading.
Further alleviating any proof problems that might arise under the
antitrust laws is the recent Supreme Court decision in Salinas v.
United States, which clarified that a conspiracy claim under section
1962(d) does not require proof that the defendant himself or herself
committed or agreed to commit a pattern of racketeering.167 Rather,
the RICO conspiracy provision covers the mere intent to further or
facilitate a criminal endeavor, whether the conspirator actually
162. Ouakinine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990). See also O’Malley v. O’Neill,
887 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1989) (requiring predicate acts to be the direct cause of plaintiff’s
injury to state a claim).
163. Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1990).
164. See id.
165. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
166. See Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386 (11th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1110 (1995);.Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384
(7th Cir. 1984), aff’d on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d
961 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom., Treasure Isle, Inc., v. United States, 459 U.S. 1183
(1983).
167. 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
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participated in the offense and whether or not the offense actually
occurred.168 In this sense, conspiracy under RICO is even more
comprehensive than the general conspiracy offense, which requires a
conspirator to have acted to effect the substantive crime.169
In addition to these specific advantages, RICO also eliminates
other impediments that might prevent a plaintiff from recovering
under the antitrust laws. First, unlike the Sherman Act in certain
cases, RICO does not require a showing of the defendant’s market
power. Second, courts that apply rule of reason analysis to challenged
conduct under the antitrust laws rely on an intensive dissection of the
facts to determine whether restraints of trade are illegal.170 By
contrast, as long as a RICO plaintiff can prove the elements of a
claim, it need not set forth facts to prove the unreasonableness of the
defendant’s activities. Finally, neither Congress nor the courts have
recognized a defense akin to the state action doctrine under RICO.
For these reasons, RICO offers an attractive alternative to plaintiffs
who are barred from recovering under the antitrust laws.
B. Municipalities’ Defenses to RICO Claims
Despite the advantages presented by RICO, major questions, still
undecided by the Supreme Court, threaten to diminish its
applicability in the local government arena. Although a municipal
entity qualifies as a “person” under RICO, there is a growing
concession among the lower courts that a municipality cannot form
the criminal intent necessary for the commission of predicate acts.
The basis for this conclusion was developed in Massey v. City of
Oklahoma City, which held that a municipal corporation is an
“artificial person” that cannot act in its own right but only through its
officers.171 Accordingly, a city is “incapable of forming the mens rea
168. Id.
169. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
170. See National Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (finding
that under the rule of reason, liability for anticompetitive acts depends on “the facts peculiar to
the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed”). Even if the
Supreme Court were to adopt a special rule of reason for local government activities, the
particular facts of the challenged conduct would remain critical to the analysis. See supra Part
II.B.
171. 643 F. Supp. 81, 85 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
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or criminal intent necessary to perform an act of racketeering as
defined by § 1961(1) of the RICO statue.”172 Subsequent courts that
have considered the issue are in agreement.173
The Third Circuit has avoided the issue of intent and instead
rejected the viability of a RICO claim on grounds that the treble
damages it affords are punitive, which precludes their application to
local governments.174 The court in Gentry v. Resolution Trust Corp.
relied on the “overwhelming mass of historical and legal precedent”
for its conclusion that in enacting RICO, Congress did not intend to
impose punitive damages upon innocent taxpayers.175 Despite the
Third Circuit’s conclusion, civil RICO has been described as a
“square peg . . . [that] will never comfortably fit in the round holes of
the remedy/penalty dichotomy.”176 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that the primary purpose of RICO is remedial.177 Some
lower courts have held that even the treble damages afforded in
section 1964(c) are remedial in nature.178 Like the Sherman Act
neither the text nor the legislative history of RICO addresses its
application to local government entities. With the divergence on the
issue that has developed in the lower courts, the question is ripe for
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Pedrina v. Chun, 97 F.3d 1296, 1300 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1268 (1997) (rejecting RICO claim as a matter of law on grounds that municipalities are
incapable of forming malicious intent); Frooks v. Town of Cortlandt, 997 F. Supp. 438, 456
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[E]very court in this Circuit that has considered the issue has held that a
municipality cannot form the requisite criminal intent to establish a predicate act” under
RICO.). See also Rini v. Zwirn, 886 F. Supp. 270, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (foreclosing the
possibility that municipal agents’ mens rea may be imputed to the municipality through the
doctrine of respondeat superior, and therefore, municipal officials may not be held liable in
their official capacities under RICO).
174. See Gentry v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1991).
175. See id. at 899-913.
176. See Faircloth v. Finesod, 938 F.2d 513, 518 (4th Cir. 1991).
177. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240-42 (1987)
(collecting legislative history that the “emphasis” of RICO treble damages is “remedial”). See
also First American Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp. 1107, 1122 (D.C. 1996) (“[T]he
overriding purpose of RICO is to provide a remedy to persons injured as a result of racketeering
activity.”).
178. See, e.g., County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 784 F. Supp. 1275, 1285 (E.D. Mich.
1992) (citing dictum in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240-42
(1987)); State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 682 (N.D. Ind.
1982), overruled on other grounds sub. nom., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 656 F. Supp. 950
(N.D. Ind. 1987). But see Washburn v. Brown, 1988 WL 130021 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (concluding
that the treble damage provision in RICO is punitive).
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Supreme Court review.
Finally, a handful of lower courts have summarily concluded that
antitrust violations are not predicate acts for the purposes of a RICO
violation.179 Those courts rely on a literal reading of the statute and
reason that because antitrust violations are not enumerated in the
statutory definition of what constitutes a “predicate act”— a
defendant’s violation of the antitrust laws does not give rise to a
claim under RICO.180 The import of these decisions could be limited,
however, to where the plaintiff states her claim in terms of the
antitrust violation rather than the racketeering conduct that gave rise
to the violation. As long as the conduct can be stated in terms
outlined by the statute, the fact that it also may constitute an antitrust
violation should not be an impediment to analysis under RICO.
V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
At the turn of the last century, it generally was assumed that the
anticompetitive mandate of the federal antitrust laws did not apply to
states or their subdivisions. As we enter the next century, those
entities still largely are immune from antitrust attacks. Today,
however, the assumption has been replaced by generations of
precedent over the last fifty years that articulate the policy rationale
for excepting government entities from antitrust review. Today it is
also clear that state boundaries are not impervious to federal antitrust
policy.
The principles of federalism are the foundation and core values
underlying the state action doctrine and its statutory offspring— the
Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984. The recent resurgence of
Eleventh Amendment immunity also reflects federalist goals.
Nevertheless, federalism is not a carte blanche or an absolute for state
actors to engage in anticompetitive activity. Rather, the immunity
afforded by these doctrines is only available where certain standards
are met.
179. See Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1438 (7th Cir. 1990); Mount v. Ormond, 1991
WL 191228, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 1991); United States v. Bonanno Organized Crime
Family, 683 F. Supp. 1411, 1432 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 879 F.2d 20 (1989). See generally
KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (1991).
180. See id.
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Eleventh Amendment immunity, although inapplicable to
municipalities, provides broad protection to state actors against a
federal antitrust attack. Once it is established that the actor is a state
or an “arm of the state,” immunity is absolute; neither treble damages
nor injunctive relief is available.181 Unlike the state action doctrine,
Eleventh Amendment protection is not conditioned on a “clearly
articulated” policy to displace competition or “active state
supervision.” Moreover, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
dramatically has circumscribed the instances in which Congress may
abrogate states’ immunity from suit.182 To displace the protection
afforded to states under the Eleventh Amendment, Congress is
narrowly limited to ensuring compliance with the federal constitution
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The state action doctrine is both broader and narrower than
Eleventh Amendment immunity. State action immunity extends
further than the Eleventh Amendment because it encompasses
political subdivisions, including municipalities and private actors. At
the same time, immunity under the state action doctrine is more
difficult to achieve because it only attaches where the state has
articulated a clearly expressed policy to displace competition. In the
case of private parties, the state must also actively supervise the
challenged conduct. Although the Supreme Court has directed that
these standards are to be interpreted liberally, it has not gone so far as
to create an automatic “status” exemption for political
181. The Ninth Circuit has identified five factors to consider in determining whether an
entity is an arm of the state entitled to immunity:
[1] whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state funds, [2] whether the
entity performs central governmental functions, [3] whether the entity may sue or be
sued, [4] whether the entity has the power to take property in its own name or only the
name of the state, and [5] the corporate status of the entity.
Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1081 (1989). Of these, the most crucial factor is whether a judgement would
impact the state treasury. See Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th
Cir. 1981). Other courts state the test in different terms. See, e.g., Daniel v. American Bd. of
Emergency Med., 988 F. Supp. 127 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (evaluating “degree of control and
supervision over entity, including state’s power of appointment and removal of officers or
directors, any authority to approve or disapprove actions of entity, whether entity is financially
independent from state, whether state is responsible for entity’s obligations and liabilities, and
character of entity’s functions”).
182. See infra Part II.B.
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subdivisions.183 Accordingly, courts have refused to turn a blind eye
to anticompetitive activity that does not meet the criteria of the state
action exemption.184
Finally, where an actor is not eligible for protection under either
the Eleventh Amendment or the state action doctrine, the Local
Government Antitrust Act of 1984 covers local governments, local
government, officials and certain private parties who deal with local
governments.185 The legislative history indicates that Congress
intended the state action doctrine to apply, by analogy, to the conduct
of a local government in directing the actions of non-governmental
parties, as if the local government were a state.186 A local
government’s activities thus need not be authorized by the state for
immunity to apply under the act. In this sense, it is easier for local
governments to achieve immunity under the act than under the state
action doctrine. However, unlike the absolute immunity afforded by
the state action doctrine, immunity under the act is only from
damages. Conduct remedies may still be imposed.
Despite the Local Government Antitrust Act’s provision for
183. See Cowboy Book, Ltd. v. Board of Regents for Agriculture and Mechanical Colleges,
728 F. Supp. 1518 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (acknowledging that “some acts of state agencies are not
acts of government by the state as sovereign”).
184. See, e.g., Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond v. Hospital Serv. Dist. No. 1 of Tangipahoa
Parish, 171 F.3d 231, 235 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. dism’d, 120 S. Ct. 37 (1999) (finding that a
Louisiana statute expanding a hospital’s powers to allow joint ventures and closed meetings did
not authorize anticompetitive conduct); Hallco Envtl., Inc. v. Comanche County Bd. of
Comm’r, 1998-1 Trade Case. (CCH) ¶ 72,175 (10th Cir. June 10, 1998) (finding that a state law
allowing the city to engage in the business of garbage reduction did not include the right to
regulate landfill sites); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. IMR Capital Corp., 888 F. Supp. 221 (D.
Mass. 1995) (denying state action immunity because telephone carriers’ refusal to provide
certain services to owners of consumer-owned coin operated telephones was actually contrary
to state policy). See also Exemptions: Texas Governor Signs Measure Letting Doctors Bargain
with HMOs, 76 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 700 (1999) (noting that the “static
supervision” in Texas legislation providing an antitrust exemption for doctors who engage in
collective bargaining likely falls short of the “active supervision” requirement for state action
immunity).
These recent cases retreat in some measure from the extreme federalism adopted by some
of the cases following a strict interpretation of Parker v. Brown. The courts seem to observe
that they will not blindly infer from a simple authorization to engage in a particular type of
conduct that anticompetitive consequence will follow. For instance, a simple land use enabling
act or grant of authority to zone might not be interpreted to imply the power to zone in an
anticompetitive manner.
185. 15 U.S.C. §§ 35-36.
186. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 98-1158, at 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4602, 4626-27.
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injunctive relief, the courts largely have avoided it. In many cases,
state action immunity bars suit altogether, precluding further analysis
under the act.187 Some courts have acknowledged the possibility of
injunctive relief under the act without actually imposing a behavioral
remedy.188 In other cases the issue is settled before trial. For instance,
in United States v. City of Stilwell, the Department of Justice brought
suit, alleging that the city unlawfully tied its water and sewer
services.189 The court entered a final judgment approving a settlement
between the parties, which enjoined the city from requiring any
customer to purchase city-supplied electric service as a condition of
receiving water or sewer service.190 Finally, in Pine Ridge Recycling
v. Butts County, the court issued an injunction against the Butts
County Solid Waste Authority for unlawfully blocking Pine Ridge
from establishing a new solid waste landfill.191 Although Georgia law
clearly articulated its policy to allow municipalities to engage in the
challenged conduct, state action immunity did not attach. The court
reasoned that interpreting the statute in this manner would violate the
Commerce Clause by restricting the movement of solid waste out of
the state. Finding that the Local Government Antitrust Act only
precluded damages against a local government entity, the court
granted a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs on the merits of the
case.192
187. See, e.g., American Int’l Sec. Specialists, Inc. v. Roberts, 161 F.3d 1 (4th Cir. 1998)
(concluding that appellees were entitled to immunity under state action, which rendered it
unnecessary to consider whether they might also be immune under the Local Government
Antitrust Act); Martin v. Memorial Hosp., 86 F.3d 1389, 1398-1400 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that appellants were immune under the state action doctrine and reversing the lower court’s
conclusion that injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and court costs were available under the act).
188. See, e.g., Martin v. Stites, 31 F. Supp.2d 926 (D. Kan. 1998) (denying defendant’s
motion for summary judgement where plaintiffs stated a claim for injunctive relief under the
antitrust laws); Northeast Jet Center, Ltd. v. LeHigh-Northampton Airport Auth., 767 F. Supp.
672, 682 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (granting plaintiff leave to amend its complaint to seek injunctive
relief).
189. See United States v. City of Stilwell, No. 96-196B (E.D. Okla. filed Apr. 25, 1996)
cited in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 479 (1996).
190. See United States v. City of Stillwell, No. 96-196B, final judgement (E.D. Okla. Nov.
5, 1998).
191. 855 F. Supp. 1264 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
192. See Pine Ridge Recycling, Inc. v. Butts County, 864 F. Supp. 1338 (M.D. Ga. 1994).
The court also denied defendants’ subsequent motions to stay the injunction. See Pine Ridge
Recycling, Inc. v. Butts County, 874 F. Supp. 1383 (M.D. Ga. 1995).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/19
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When taken together it is clear that the multifaceted protections
afforded to local government actors leave little room for the federal
antitrust laws to affect land use issues. In addition, Chief Justice
Rehnquist has suggested that the application of traditional antitrust
standards to local government activity is wholly inappropriate.193 In
his dissent in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,
then-Justice Rehnquist foreshadowed the Court’s distaste for
imposing the antitrust laws on local government entities. Rehnquist
asserted that even if the rule of reason were applied, municipalities
would be subject to “wide-ranging, essentially standardless
inquir[ies] into the reasonableness of local regulation.”194 Moreover,
free competition, he concluded, may not always be a reasonable or
expedient means of meeting the public’s needs in the social welfare
arena.195 In the years since that dissent, the courts effectively have
circumvented antitrust analysis in the local government context by
finding immunity in the great majority of cases.196 Although neither
Congress nor the Court has disavowed completely the federal
antitrust laws application to local governments, the protective
doctrines virtually have achieved that end.
In short, the ideology of federalism has displaced a national model
of competition for one favoring state-based resolutions. The resulting
state law primacy leaves “more room for a state’s action when the
primary harm, if any, is felt by its own citizens.”197 The Supreme
Court has attempted to harmonize substantial state interests in
regulating local conduct with the need for a federal, united
competition policy.198 It has struck that balance in favor of state
political interest when it considers the federal antitrust application too
burdensome. This approach is consistent with the Court’s recent
193. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
194. See id. at 67.
195. Id. at 66.
196. Of the 116 cases reported in Westlaw where the courts have considered or discussed
application of the Local Government Antitrust Act, only two have granted injunctions. See Pine
Ridge Recycling, Inc. v. Butts County, 864 F. Supp. 1338 (M.D. Ga. 1994); Oberndorf v. City
and County of Denver, 653 F. Supp. 304 (D. Colo. 1986).
197. 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION, ¶ 220 (1978).
198. Id. at 130.
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Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, which is taking the ideology of
federalism to new extremes. At the turn of the new century,
federalism has achieved its greatest ascendancy since the 1930s. Its
triumph over competition is nearly complete in the field of land use
regulation as well.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/19
